

**DoD Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Consequence Management (CM)
Conference Summary
20 August 2007**

The third annual DoD CBRN CM Conference was held from 31 July through 2 August 2007, with over 170 participants and presenters in attendance. Most attendees were from DoD -- OSD, Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and Combat Support Agencies -- in military grades 0-4 through 0-6 or equivalent civilian grades. The Conference was sponsored by the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs and hosted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Objectives for this year's conference were to:

- Update DoD CBRN CM planners and operators on issues, policies, plans, and tools that impact DoD's CBRN CM community
- Share ideas and provide feedback to each other and to offices of primary responsibility regarding effects of recent studies or of recent or pending changes to CBRN CM policies or plans
- Explore solutions to common problems

Agenda topics were chosen in collaboration with respective OSD and Joint Staff offices of primary responsibility and selected because of their timeliness and significance to the DoD CBRN CM community. Presenters were from the DoD or DHS offices with primary oversight responsibility for or cognizance of the topics being briefed and discussed. Most presentations and discussions were unclassified, but one half of one day was devoted to classified briefings and discussions at the Defense Threat Reduction Center on Ft. Belvoir.

In addition, several specialized DoD units and one non-DoD organization provided displays of their unique capabilities and equipment:

- Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute
- Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) (USMC)
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Defense Information Analysis Center (CBRNIAC)
- DTRA/CB
- DTRA/PA
- Defense Threat Reduction University
- Interagency Combating WMD Database of Responsibilities, Authorities & Capabilities (INDRAC)
- International Association of Emergency Managers
- Joint Project Manager Guardian
- Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTFCS)
- US Army Chemical School
- 33rd CST – DC National Guard

The original intent of the conference hosts had been to develop a set of conclusions and recommendations from each presentation and the ensuing discussions. However, as a primary

intent of this conference was dissemination of the latest information on a variety of CM-related topics, neither controversy nor consensus emerged. The complete set of briefing slides for all presentations, as well as a complete roster of conference attendees and their contact information, is available on a secure web site at www.ocweb.osn.dtra.smil.mil/cwip. However, for ease of reference by conference attendees and other interested parties, the key points from each unclassified presentation are summarized in the attachment.

During the course of the conference, and in the post-conference critiques, several suggestions were made by conference participants regarding topics for further discussion and for considerations for future conferences focusing on CM:

- Synchronize or schedule future CM conferences in proximity to another event
- Invite each COCOM to make a presentation on status of CBRN CM issues and progress within their respective AORs
- Include more FCM issues or discussion on the agenda
 - Include a presentation or panel discussion by the State Department
 - Invite participation or a presentation of issues from a host nation perspective, such as Japan or Italy
- Involve DHS and its components more actively in the presentations and discussions
- Invite participation or presentations by representative state or local government officials, to get their perspectives on assistance from DoD.
- Invite participation or a presentation by Headquarters of various Reserve Component organizations, in addition to the National Guard, to hear of their CBRN CM capabilities.
- Additional information regarding how the National Guard interacts or interfaces with other government agencies and with DoD Active Components.
- A general overview of what we are seeing or learning from DoD's participation in the variety of CM/FCM-related exercises in which we do participate.

Based upon the information presented and discussed at the conference, and the suggestions noted above, the following topics have been submitted to USSTRATCOM for addressal during a Consequence Management module or breakout session at an upcoming COCOM Combating WMD Conference. Otherwise these issues will be addressed at the next CBRN CM Conference.

- COCOMs present CM status and issues; articulate where assistance is needed
- J8 JRO CM CBA -- what do we do with the final product? Who is willing to be the OPR for some of the Functional Solution Analysis recommendations?
- Interagency (Non-DoD, or even non-governmental) organizations and their capabilities; do we need to address or include them in our DoD plans?
- Are separate CBRN CM conferences appropriate? How broad should they be? Should future CBRN CM conferences be combined with COCOM Combating WMD Conferences?
- FCM:
 - Follow up work on Zephyr Bantu 07 action items
 - Further agreements or work required with DOS?
 - How do military attachés and embassy staffs fit in? How are they used?
- Joint Staff planning considerations:
 - Follow up actions required to LTC Deal's concept brief?

- Action required on LTC Cartledge's concept brief?
- CCMRF Issues

Sincere appreciation is extended to all conference presenters for the quality and content of their presentations. Sincere thanks are also extended to those who provided the special displays, especially the personnel from the 33rd CST, District of Columbia National Guard. Finally, thanks to all attendees for your active participation, discussion, questions, and suggestions.

Anyone wishing to take issue with or offer suggestions regarding the attached summary of key points – especially the presenters – are invited to submit comments to David.Jurk@dtra.mil, who may also be reached at 703-767-4402 or DSN 427-4402.

For updates to the attachment or information presented at the conference, please check periodically at www.ocweb.osn.dtra.smil.mil/cwip. Information regarding future DoD CBRN CM conferences will also be posted at www.cmconferences.org.

Atch: Presentation Summary

**“Planning the Way Ahead”
Third Annual DOD CBRN CM Conference**

CM Conference Opening and Welcome

Dr. Tegnalia, DTRA Director

Main Points:

- There is a difference between chem/bio activity and nuclear activity and the attitudes toward each. Consequences of nuclear events are perceived as being so horrific that the U.S. needs to do everything it can to prevent an attack. Almost 100% of funds are spent on how to prevent a nuclear attack, in contrast to the chem/bio arena where money is going toward response and CM efforts.
- The challenge to the consequence management community is showing the impact we can have on the reducing effects of a CBRN incident, i.e., convincing people that CM actions will have a significant impact on reducing the number of casualties and damage.
- We need to develop more technological tools that can be force multipliers for CM, show the impact of various CM strategies, and to demonstrate the value of CM.

The Homeland Defense and DSCA Policy Environment

Mr. Chavez, OASD(HD&ASA)

- The National Strategy for Homeland Security must address the full cycle of activities across the “Preparedness” continuum: prevention, protection, response, recovery.
- The National Response Plan (NRP) is not so much a response plan as a response framework. National planning documents discuss structure and relationships but do not operationally plan for an event. The next step is to do capabilities-based assessment, gap analysis, and identify resource requirements.
- The USG is using momentum from Katrina to examine its plans and policies; however, the current examination is considering only government entities, not non-governmental organizations’ capabilities.
- National Standards should be developed so that resource levels can be planned and applied the same across the board.
- More regionally-focused planning is required – at all levels of government.
- Current national planning focuses on 15 discreet scenarios. Eventually planning needs to consider simultaneously-occurring events.
- DoD entities must integrate more closely with civilian authorities at the local, state, regional, and federal levels to plan a cohesive response to CBRN events. The military are part of local

communities and will be impacted by incidents that occur. Military installations should coordinate CM planning with local authorities, including development of comprehensive mutual aid agreements.

- DoD usually provides DSCA support on a cost-reimbursable basis. However, under Immediate Response Authority (IRA), DoD cannot delay response awaiting reimbursement assurance. DoD is a member of the community also and depends on rapid response as well.
- USG is significantly falling short with medical surge – not enough capacity for medical treatment or mass decontamination during a mass casualty event.
- DoD joins a DSCA effort to augment a plan -- not to go in and take over.
- National Guard forces responding in “state status” will get people to an incident faster. It’s better to leave Title 10 forces freed up to do other things.
- DoD thought by some to be only in response mode – there’s the idea that we’re not involved in prevention or protection. We are, but we call it deter, defend, defeat.

The Foreign Consequence Management Environment

COL Woloszyn, OASD(GSA)

- Need a clear National Policy for FCM activities from DOS in order to:
 - Ensure US assets are prepared and resourced to respond to events
 - Build the capacity of our partners to respond, mitigate and recover from a CBRN event
 - Guide interagency support planning and activities
- Efforts are continuing to refine the FCM (WMD CM) Annex to NSPD-17/HSPD-4 which will provide national guidance to refine DoD instructions, FCM Playbooks and aid in establishing Bilateral Agreements.
- Multinational conferences and symposiums should be encouraged and expanded to discuss capabilities and challenges.
- Issues identified during Exercise Zephyr Bantu must continue to be worked and resolved.
- Wilton Park Debrief:
 - Greatest significance of initial conference in 2007 was that international dialogue was opened regarding CBRN CM preparedness and challenges in the European theater.
 - Challenges to CBRN effects that cross borders in Europe include:
 - Freeing up and release of unique national assets
 - Cross-border movement and application of specialized teams
 - Lack of common procedures/capabilities
 - The need for more multilateral exercises
 - Decision makers (not their surrogates) need to be exercised in their CBRN CM roles and exercised more frequently than is now the case.

- Small, issue-focused symposiums will likely be continued in the future.
- DoD CBRN Conference attendees endorsed the concept of engaging PACOM and SOUTHCOM, and key allies in those regions in a “Wilton Park type” event.
 - EUCOM could also expand the invitation for the next iteration to include more EUCOM and interagency members.

The Primacy of State, Local, and Host Nation Authorities

Mr. Barnhill, DTRA/CSM

- Fundamental Principle - all disasters begin and end in someone’s hometown
- Military authorities should develop a rapport with state, local, and/or host nation authorities; acknowledge the DOD role following a CBRN incident; and inform local and state authorities of what military capabilities and response timelines can realistically be expected following a CBRN CM event.
- Current perception is that following a CBRN incident which overwhelms state and local authorities, DOD elements will “arrive late, leave early, and try to take over control” while they are there.
- Military installation commanders need to understand the local, state, and/or host nation abilities and capabilities to respond to a CBRN event and efforts to promote unity of effort and prevent duplication of work.
- Within the US, there is no governmental structure at the “regional” level; however, following a significant CBRN event, a “regional” type of response is what will be needed.

Global Synchronizer for Combating WMD

LTC Cartledge, USSTRATCOM

- USSTRATCOM is charged with integrating and synchronizing “combating WMD: across all of DoD.
- Primary focus of STRATCOM 8099 is state actors, whereas GWOT is focused on non-state actors. The “proliferation pathway” is a gray area.
- When the initial 8099 CM construct was developed, one course of action was to eliminate Annex T, put all “wartime” CWMD/CM activities in Annex C of Appendix 2, Tab C, and put everything else related to CM into Annex G, “Civil Affairs.”
 - Unless every response to CBRN incidents is categorized as WMD-CM, it is not possible to eliminate Annex T until/unless the Joint Community agrees to put non-WMD CM operations into Annex G.
 - Some prefer looking elsewhere in the JOPES construct to determine the best fit of operations into the right Annexes, to ensure appropriate linkages are included in plan sections so that component and subordinate commands understand what is required.

- Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) establishes command and control of Title 10 Forces, when directed by NORTHCOM, in support of civil authorities during CBRNE incidents.
 - Command Assessment Element: assesses scope and magnitude of incident so as to anticipate DOD task.
 - Joint Technical Augmentation Cell (JTAC): provides exportable planning expertise for CBRNE consequence management operations to OCONUS Commands.
 - Joint Planning Augmentation Cell (JPAC): provides exportable planning expertise for CBRNE consequence management operations.
- JTF-CS operates in two postures: 1) Steady State: planning/preparing, to include NSSE's and exercises; and 2) Execution: post-incident operations.
- JTF-CS has playbooks for the national planning scenarios.
 - The integration of DOD assets with civilian authorities at the local, state, regional, and federal levels is an ongoing process that must include constant planning, communication and evaluation from all viewpoints.
 - Reciprocal communication between local communities and DOD - before an incident - is crucial to ensuring an adequate and efficient response.
- Locals have a better understanding of what assets are immediately available, the process for requesting assets, and how long before arrival of those assets.
- DOD preparedness for mission accomplishment can be significantly enhanced by familiarity with the local environment, topography, rules, and customs.

- DoD focal point for evolving or improving DoD CBRN CM-related technologies.
 - Currently working most closely with Joint Staff J-8/JRO and the National Guard

- Purpose: based upon DHS national planning scenarios 1, 4, 8, 9, provide a starting point for future analysis and insights on DoD's ability to support Consequence Management (CM).
 - Primary customers are ASD(HD&ASA), Joint Staff J8, and USNORTHCOM.
 - Baseline analysis is expected to drive budgeting and manpower for future DoD CBRN CN preparedness.
- Study to be presented in draft to the interagency working group on Aug 17; final release will be in October.

- Multi-service force deployment (MSFD) for Civil Support was not completely validated, as will be documented in the final report.
- Conclusions addressed in classified portion of presentation.

WMD CM Capabilities Based Assessment

LTC Smedley, J8/JRO

- Assessment applies to both foreign and domestic CM. Tasks comprising the Functional Area Analysis (FAA) were distilled from the DoD UJTL (949) and the DHS UTL (972).
 - Capabilities were vetted and input gathered from the COCOMs, Services, SMEs, JPEO
 - Separate CBAs for domestic and foreign CM would provide more fidelity; however, nine months is inadequate time to complete such a study.
- Prioritizing the gaps from the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and recommended solutions from the Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) are still works in progress.
- Document to be out for staffing approximately 7 September.
- When finally published, there should be no revisions to the document...rather the document enters a cycle where it is re-accomplished every two years.
- Conclusions addressed in classified portion of presentation.

NORTHCOM Role in CM Planning

MAJ Pace, USNORTHCOM

- Classified presentation

Joint Staff Concept for Relationship between Plans

LTC Deal, J3

- Classified presentation

National Guard Contributions to CBRN CM

MAJ Molbert, NGB

- Broad overview of capabilities

National Exercise Program

Mr. McNally, DHS

- There are too many exercises “out there”; too demanding of time and money. Goal of the National Exercise Office (and many others) to maximize effectiveness of each exercise and minimize total numbers.
- A National Level Executive Steering Committee, consisting of 10 members, is being set up to oversee a 5-year NEP calendar and to ensure all national exercises are coordinated.

Chairman-sponsored exercise program (CSEP) consists of five major elements:

- ELIGIBLE RECEIVER (ER) - CPX/FTX 12-18 month cycle
 - No-notice Interoperability Exercise designed to practice interagency response to crisis situations

- POSITIVE RESPONSE (PR) - CPX/Seminar As required
 - Variable scale exercises addressing specific CJCS issues
 - Exercises from FY04 through FY08 have increasingly focused on HLS/HLD, DSCA during natural disasters, and integration of PR exercises into multiple DHS and COCOM exercises.
 - Synchronization of these exercises via the National Exercise Program has become paramount to this effort

- NATO CRISIS MGMT EXERCISE (CMX) – CPX Annual
 - Practice and test NATO crisis management procedures
 - Unlike other CSEP exercises, US is only a participant in CMX rather than owner. In CMX 08, there are 26 NATO nations participating.

- POSITIVE FORCE (PF) - CPX/FTX 18 month cycle
 - Large scale worldwide exercise addressing mobilization, deployment, and/or sustainment issues

- US-Russian THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD) As agreed between US and RF
 - Presidentially directed CPX / FTX - TMD

- Primary objective of the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) is to enhance US joint warfighting capabilities by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF), and policy

- Technical solutions are required for JLLP to meet its full potential as a joint force enabler. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the technical solution being developed to achieve that potential.
 - JLLIS is comprised of two parts: input and management support tool; Joint Lessons Learned Repository (JLLR)
 - Input and management support tool allows users to submit observations via a web-enabled user interface.
 - JLLR provides users a single location to access validated observations, lessons, and issues.

- Current stakeholders are Joint Staff, Services (to include Reserve Components), Combatant Commands, Combat Support Agencies, National Guard, and other organizations participating in joint activities

DTRA's Role in CBRN CM Exercises

Mr. Danshaw, DTRA/CSM

- Coordinate and integrate WMD consequence management exercises across DoD
 - Develop and manage the DoD strategic WMD CM exercise program
 - Sponsor & assist in CM exercise execution
 - Participate in WMD CM exercises, forums and conferences
- Collect and integrate observations from CM exercises to facilitate development of WMD CM lessons learned
- Exercise Principles: objectives based exercises ; "building block" approach; "no exercise is an island," i.e., each exercise is built on past training or experience and directly relates to a previous or subsequent event; tailored to the user's objectives

Status & Content of DTRA/DOD CM Planning Guide

Mr. Nelson, DTRA/CSM

- Concept of the September 2000 *FCM Planning Guide* is being updated and re-written as a DoD CBRN CM Planning Guide to address both foreign and domestic CM.
- Target audience for this guide is the CM Planner at the COCOM and is intended to be short, functional and useful.
- Draft to be sent out the week of 13 August for review and comment.

CBRN CM Crisis Communications from DOD's Perspective

Mr. Miles, USNORTHCOM

- People (potential victims) aren't ready to receive information until they feel threatened or that they will be affected.
- It's impossible for DoD to leave the scene of an event when DoD is still "on the front page."
- Cultivate good media relations before a crisis event happens: build recognition; build rapport; "train" media on what DoD can be expected to say and when
- DoD can always say: 1) what we have been asked to do and 2) where we have been asked to do it

WMD Legal Desk Reference and FCM Legal Desk Book

Mr. Gillette, DTRA/GC

- DCM Legal Reference: identifies legal authorities available to Executive Branch Departments and Agencies responding to a WMD event involving terrorism or an accident.
- FCM Legal Desk Book: identifies legal authorities available to US departments and agencies responding to a CBRNE event on foreign soil.

CM Training at the US Army Chemical School

LTC Mike Dutchuk, USACMLS

- Over the last decade, threat and operating environments have changed:
 - Threat: expanded to include industrial CBRN materials, radiological dispersion devices, advances in genetic engineering, and unknowns
 - Environment: expanded to include homeland, urban, industrial
 - Missions are now: stability, support and reconstruction operations; DSCA; WMD-elimination; and interdiction
 - Others actors that must now be considered: civil authorities (US & foreign), non-combatants, Defense Agencies, DHS, DOS
 - According to *Public Law 103-160*
 - Fort Leonard Wood, MO serves as the center for DOD CBRN training, including CBRN Consequence Management training
- Hosts U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps CBRN schools