

**DoD Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Consequence Management
Conference
After Action Report & Conference Summary
3 October 2008**

The fourth annual Department of Defense (DoD) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Consequence Management (CM) Conference was held from 16 through 18 September 2008, with over 150 participants and presenters in attendance. The Conference was sponsored by the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs and hosted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

The conference provided both military and interagency CM professionals an opportunity to come together and discuss CM issues, policies, and experiences within the field. This year's conference focused on both Foreign CM and Domestic CM issues, especially as they relate to the Combatant Commands. Last year the community expressed in numerous After Action Report (AAR) comments the desire to hear what the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) were doing in relation to CM in their area of responsibility (AOR), including what challenges they face, issues they have regarding policy/doctrine, and what means they have found most effective in preparing for and executing CM operations within their AOR.

MG Miyagi was the speaker for US Pacific Command (PACOM) and Retired Vice Admiral Roger Rufe, the Director of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Operations Directorate, spoke on the Integrated National Planning for CBRNE Response. BG Cook, Commander of the 415th Chemical Brigade, spoke on the transformation of the Army Reserves to meet the needs of Homeland Defense. In addition, we provided several interagency organizations, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department of State (DOS) an opportunity to discuss their operations and issues.

Objectives for this year's conference were to:

- Provide forum for Interagency CBRN CM decision makers & planners to develop deeper understanding of capabilities, limitations & challenges faced by all.
- Discuss first-hand Domestic (DHS) & Foreign (DOS) LFA expectations of DoD supporting organizations during CBRN CM event.
- Identify challenges faced at COCOM level in support of CBRN CM missions & discussion in overcoming those challenges.
- Provide venue to promote achievements and discuss obstacles overcome to reach them.

In addition, several specialized DoD units and non-DoD organizations provided displays of their unique capabilities and equipment:

- OptiMetrics, Inc.
- SafetyTech International, Inc.
- CON-SPACE Communications
- Region III DCO

- DTRA
- DTRA/PA
- The Defense Nuclear Weapon School (DNWS)

During the course of the conference, and in the post-conference critiques, several suggestions were made by conference participants regarding topics for further discussion and for considerations for future conferences focusing on CM. The following is a list of issues and recommendations:

Issue: State and Local participation

Discussion: Many participants stated they are interested in hearing from a state or local representative about what they would expect from DoD during a catastrophic event. The issue is that governments vary from state to state and by inviting a state or local representative, participants only benefit from the views of that one state.

Recommendation: Invite a Readiness Response Coordinator from FEMA to talk about multiple states.

Issue: General overview of CM/FCM related exercises

Discussion: Participants are interested in seeing a general overview of what DTRA is seeing or learning from DoD's participation in the variety of CM/FCM related exercises in which DTRA participates.

Recommendation: Have DTRA/CSMA do an in-house presentation covering past year's lessons learned from exercises.

Issue: Networking

Discussion: Many positive comments were made about the opportunity to network and reconnect with DoD CBRN CM folks at the conference. The Social was also a great opportunity to meet people and should be kept for future conferences.

Recommendation: Ensure the agenda includes at least 15 minute breaks and longer lunches (an hour and a half) to give people the chance to network. Hold next year's Social at the Heritage Center to enhance participation since they won't have to drive anywhere.

Issue: Mix of presentations

Discussion: There should be a mix of presentations to ensure briefings aren't tracked into one set group of people.

Recommendation: Maintain balance and have a keynote speaker each day.

Issue: Level of presenters

Discussion: Both DOE and FBI sent junior people to give their presentation.

Recommendation: Have a formal letter sent from Ms. Montie to the Organization requesting their attendance as a speaker and inform them of the other high level speakers attending.

Issue: Mix of attendees

Discussion: More non-DoD attendance was requested by participants.

Recommendation: Advertise via professional associations such as the Homeland Security News Letter, IAEM, and the DTRA Newsletter. Also hang posters in DNWS, contact LNOs, and have the DCOs at ARNORTH talk to FEMA reps regarding the conference.

Issue: Working Groups (WGs)

Discussion: Participants felt that some of the WGs were too big or ran too long while others found the format to be odd and would have preferred a presentation versus a WG. WGs serve a better purpose if they are actually tasked to do something.

Recommendation: Tweak structure of WGs based on abstracts, presentations, time allotted, and other items (which may determine whether or not WGs are even needed).

Issue: Acronyms

Discussion: Not everyone is familiar with the many acronyms the military has which can make it hard to follow presentations if not spelled out.

Recommendation: Ask presenters to provide briefs three weeks in advance so they can be looked through and acronyms can be spelled out.

Issue: Presentation length

Discussion: Many presenters went over their time allotted. Time limits need to be stressed ahead of time and there needs to be a mechanism for keeping time.

Recommendation: Have the MC give a quick one-on-one with the speaker before he/she goes up to let them know a time-enforcer will be holding up a Q-card in the back giving both a ten and five minute warning.

Issue: Timing of lunch

Discussion: Participants thought that lunch was served too late which led to difficulty concentrating during the last couple of morning briefs. What participants weren't aware of is that there was an agreement to serve lunch late in order to empty the cafeteria of the normal lunch hour rush (which won't be an issue next year).

Recommendation: Serve lunch earlier.

Issue: AV

Discussion: There were some issues with some of the videos not working and at times additional breaks needed to be taken in order to switch from the unclassified side to the classified side.

Recommendation: Use two machines – one unclassified and one classified so briefings can be easily interchanged. Have presentations with videos sent in early to ensure the video works properly.

Issue: Website

Discussion: Due to certain circumstances, key information is not allowed to be posted on the conference website which doesn't allow for ideal advertising. Requests are being made internally to allow for more information to be posted.

Recommendation: Improve current CM Conference Website capabilities and have it running 24/7/365. Ensure the new website mirrors the site through DTRA on the

SIPRNET side so additional information can be posted. Examples of capability improvements include administrative functions, early recruiting and coordination to book keynote speakers, VIPs, participants, and vendors early, incorporate a late fee to encourage participants to register early, build a solid agenda 3-months prior to the conference, repository for previous conference materials, references and networking, lessons learned and corrective action resolution, etc. Additionally, CMAT capability, function, and requirement improvements will be incorporated into website LOE by integrating controlled accessibility to (U) references and base documents when CMAT personnel do not have field access to SIPRNET or the DTRA file server. Website development and capability improvements will correct most if not all issues raised by CM Conference AARs/Summaries.

Issue: State and Local Perspective on DoD support during CM Event

Discussion: Many events have taken place recently (e.g. Texas hurricanes, California wildfires, etc.) and the CM community could benefit from a state or local representative's perspective on DoD support during such a disaster.

Recommendation: Have a representative from Texas (for example) who dealt with DoD while working with the hurricanes to brief the community on what did and did not work.

Issue: Training

Discussion: Many participants are interested in CM training available from all sources.

Recommendation: Have a representative from the training school attend in person who can discuss one-on-one which courses would be good for an individual to take depending on that person's job rather than just dropping off booklets and leaving. Also, incorporate a page of links to all courses on the conference website and on the conference CD.

Issue: "Operator" level brief

Discussion: Some participants are interested in hearing a DHS "operator" level brief on CM at TSOC.

Recommendation: Incorporate into a Breakout Session.

Issue: Service level programs/response to CM

Discussion: Participants are interested in hearing perspectives from Navy, Marines, etc.

Recommendation: Create a conference booklet with "nice to know" information that doesn't necessarily need to be talked about during the conference. Include an electronic version on the conference CD.

Issue: Other Nations' presentation on CM activities

Discussion: Participants are interested in hearing other nations speak on CM activities; however it would be very difficult to arrange for such an event.

Recommendation: Have specific COCOMs address vital countries in their Area of Responsibility (AOR) that could assist.

Issue: Lessons Learned

Discussion: Many participants are interested in an overview of lessons learned from CM exercises.

Recommendation: Provide more information about Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) during the conference.

Issue: COCOMs

Discussion: Some participants felt the COCOMs did not present any new information. Participants want to see what has changed.

Recommendation: Give COCOMs more of a structure and allow for one or two background slides for those that are new to the field.

Internal AAR Points

- Sit down with Security and PAO up front and tell them our rough plans to start working early on.
- Get dates on leadership calendars now.
- Give attendees hotel names and let them book their own room.
- Agenda – establish basis for agenda early on:
 - Structure
 - Selective on time-frames for speakers

Sincere appreciation is extended to all conference presenters for the quality and content of their presentations. Sincere thanks are also extended to those who provided the special displays. Finally, thanks to all attendees for your active participation, discussion, questions, and suggestions.

Anyone wishing to take issue with or offer suggestions regarding the attached conference summary – especially the presenters – are invited to submit comments to charles.phillips@dtra.mil, who may also be reached at 703-767-4393.

For updates to the attachment or information presented at the conference, please check periodically at www.ocweb.osn.dtra.smil.mil/cwip. Information regarding future DoD CBRN CM conferences will also be posted at www.cmconferences.org.

Attachment: Presentation Summary

2008 CM Conference Summary

DAY 1

Opening Remarks

Given By: Deputy Director BG Manner

BG Manner opened the 2008 CBRN Consequence Management (CM) Conference by recognizing how important it was to be there. He stated the two principle objectives for Consequence Management which are protecting American citizens and preserving American interests. He addressed the need to avoid a Katrina situation in a CBRN event and to take care of citizenry to the extent they expect. His six expectations for conference attendees were:

1. Focus on the big picture; don't get bogged down in the details.
2. Work with the interagency.
3. Find seams in policy.
4. Seek senior leader sponsorship and involvement.
5. Read all the previous AARs to learn from the past.
6. NETWORK with people in your community.

Foreign Consequence Management Program, Policy, Issues from the Joint Staff Perspective

Presenter: COL Thomas Steele, JS J34 CBRNE

Col Steele gave a brief tutorial on FCM as it relates to relevant strategic guidance and doctrine. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for FCM. Much of the strategic level guidance is still being written and the JS is currently awaiting resubmission from the DOS their input for NSPD 17 and HSPD 4. Though still in DRAFT, CJCSI 3214.01C delineates much of the responsibilities among the DOD responders and how they interface with the interagency. One exception to the RFA rule is for Immediate Response. The FCM-specific definition of Immediate Response Authority includes only life saving activity. Other MOUs or MOAs are approved by the Embassy, but every other request must go through the Request for Assistance process, which must be routed through the FCM DCO and the GCC. The JS reps then detailed the FCM phases. There are no standing forces dedicated to FCM. They are currently assessing whether use of the CCMRF OCONUS is feasible and STRATCOM is currently assessing GCC capabilities to mitigate the effects of WMD attacks at DOD installations OCONUS and in support of our foreign partners.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- DOS is the lead for FCM and DOD takes task orders from DOS, provided they are approved by SECDEF.
- The FCM-specific definition of Immediate Response Authority includes only life saving activity.
- There are no standing forces dedicated to FCM.
- The JS is currently assessing whether use of the CCMRF OCONUS is feasible.

National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF) Program Update
Presenter: Mr. Art Beasley, DTRA

Briefing was classified SECRET.

Foreign Emergency Support Team & Embassy operations in crisis
Presenter: Mr. Brian Lewis, Department of State

Mr. Lewis began by briefly delineating what constitutes FCM, and what constitutes traditional Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR); FCM involves a contaminant, it's international and it requires a request from the host nation. He then explained the policy background for the DOS leadership vis-à-vis FCM, which DOD must support. There are multiple offices that have equity in FCM in DOS:

- International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (WMDT), whose mission is to deter employment, detect/disrupt movement, ensure attribution, and respond to release. This is the primary CM component.
- Also mentioned were the ISN-Chemical, Biological; DOS, Oceans and Environmental Sciences; DOS, Counterterrorism Office: Terrorism and Crisis operations.

Mr. Lewis then explained the purview of the FEST to augment the embassy in an event and the team's duties pre- and post-event. The majority of the FEST's duties are pre-event to prepare nations to capably respond internally. Post-event, however, if required by the host nation, DOS deploys expertise after request by the host nation and approval by US government, to integrate with the stricken nation's response leadership, clarify and validate requests for bilateral and international support, and coordinate U.S. contribution to the local response. Mr. Lewis detailed the composition of a team, their organic transportation assets and capabilities. He then enumerated the process for requesting aid, and the actions that DOS takes in order to meet those requests. There is no Common Operating Picture for FCM; all attempts at a COP are ad hoc solutions.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- DOS is the lead for FCM.
- Much of the work for FCM is done pre-event so as to maximize the capabilities of a host nation, but also to forge relationships.
- For FCM to work well, one must get "buy-in" from the host nation that's being supported. Without that, all efforts are for naught.
- The FEST brings a unique capability to FCM.

PACOM PI Plan

Presenter: Lt Col Roger Nelson, USPACOM HQ

Lt Col Roger Nelson briefed attendees on Pandemic Influenza, highlighting the similarities between Consequence Management and a Biological Event. He based his comments on the critical assumption that a contagious biological event, such as Pandemic Influenza, requires the same capabilities to stop, limit, or contain as a consequence management event. He stressed the criticality of communication stating that in the event of a pandemic or a CM incident there is little you can do beyond sharing accurate information. He emphasized the need to detect early, respond quickly, and contain. Lt Col Nelson asked participants to seek opportunities to build capacity and share resources within the force and AOR that support the goals and priorities that will make the U.S. successful in the fight against terrorism by sustaining a healthy and ready force.

During the Q&A session, LtCol Nelson was asked if Pandemic Influenza required a trigger event to initiate a response. Lt Col Nelson replied that, in general, biological events rely on trends. The most reliable indicator of an outbreak is sustainability from human to human. If the organism is contagious and sustainable, you can initiate response measures.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- A Biological Event requires the same capabilities to control as a CM event.
- Communication is essential in order to detect respond and contain.
- Need to work together, building capacity and sharing resources.

Working Group 1: Joint Technical Augmentation Cell Element (JTACE)

Moderator: LTC Jay Hall

The working group session presented current USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD) initiatives relating to Joint Technical Augmentation Cell Element (JTACE). The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) tasked USSTRATCOM to develop an operational concept for using continental U.S. (CONUS) Consequence Management (CM) assets in a non- domestic CM (N-DCM) event. The key issue guiding the operational concept is whether the roles and responsibilities of the JTACE in CJCSI 3214.01C are the most effective and responsive way of providing CBRN technical advice to GCCs in a FCM operation. Four courses for organizing and executing the JTACE mission were identified by the FCM Technical Support Analysis Group and presented to the attendees.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- Solutions offered by operational concept should not be limited by doctrine. The operational concept needs to address the issues that the GCC might face and make the necessary changes to improve their ability to support FCM missions.
- Determining the distinction between a JTACE and a Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT) needs to be established. Community believed the difference

between the two is not clearly defined. Establishing their roles and responsibilities would allow the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) to have a better understanding of what type of advice and assistance each can provide in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) event.

- There is a gap in the organic capability of the GCC staff to respond to CBRN CM events in their Area of Responsibility (AOR). The GCC staff should have a baseline level of CBRN CM expertise to be able to respond to an event.
- Language in CJCSI 3214.01C revision would need to be changed to reflect the COA that is taken.
- USSTRATCOM does not want to be tasked as a force provider for JTACE. Unified Command Plan (UCP) language for USTRATCOM defines their role as “synchronizing of plans and advocating capabilities for CM capabilities.” All the Course of Action (COAs), except COA1, are in line with UCP role.
- The owner of JTACE would be responsible for deploying JTACE to training and exercises, reporting its readiness to GCCs, and tasking a service to provide forces for technical advice. Language in CJCSI does not task these responsibilities.
- In response to COA 3-If the JTACE were to be removed, would the capabilities provided by it still be required?

COA 1: Maintain JTACE as is. Need to look at the effectiveness of current language.

COA 2: US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) “ownership” with Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) support: JTACE request process would be streamlined. JTACE may not get the same level of attention from USJFCOM. COA would move tasking responsibility from USTRATCOM to USJFCOM. This requires the least amount of restructuring of CJCSI.

COA 3: Dissolve JTACE. There is the possibility that the community has outgrown the need for a JTACE. Expertise and support can be provided by increasing level of expertise on the GCC staff and through Request for Forces/ Request for Capabilities (RFF/ RFC) process. COA lacks a means of ensuring that forces are deployable and that forces have gone through joint training.

COA 4: JFCOM ownership with Army core element: Question was raised whether a service should be tasked with this responsibility. Army does not operate under a Joint or Inter-Agency framework. By having the forces provided by the Army, it allows them to work and train together before they deploy.

Working Group 2: DCO role in FCM

Moderator: Maj Frank Virgadamo

Maj Virgadamo opened discussion on the DCO in FCM by asking participants what they thought were the principle responsibilities of the stateside DCO. It was agreed that DC supports the Lead Federal Officer as the Defense representative at the disaster site. His major function is to match the requests of the customer to actual capabilities. Through the

use of Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs), the DCO has access to experts in the local region. The DCO is generally a senior officer at the O-6 level capable of making decisions. He is incorporated into the DSCSA system and capable of providing situational awareness. His final role responsibility is to maintain financial accountability.

In FCM operations, the DCO needs to answer two questions: Does the Combatant Commander have the capability, and if not, where to go. It was generally agreed that the FCM DCO needs decision making authority and that the position would be a billeted one. The position would require two hats – one at the embassy and one at the Combatant Command. It was suggested that the FCM DCO could be a military liaison.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- Position will change based on the COCOM – Is there a different requirement set/model for each GCC? Should the decision be left up to the GCCs?
- Is this something the Ambassadors actually want?
- HN may not want assistance from U.S.
- Training Requirements?
 - o DSCA phases 1-2
 - o State Department – FEMA Online
 - o Regional courses - WHINSEC, Marshall, APCSS
 - o Develop a new program
 - o PRT Training

Working Group 3: GCC OCONUS Mitigation Response Evaluations

Moderator: Mr. Tom Wheeler

The main challenge for FCM is the fact that there are no assets in GCC's Areas of Responsibility (AOR) The EUCOM representative wanted to know if something happened in his AOR, could CBIRF, a CCMRF or like capability be deployed in a timely fashion to provide CM. The JS rep then told him that he could promise nothing in the conference setting, but to submit a request and let the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) determine what EUCOM would get. Then Department of State representative raised a concern that the US wouldn't be able to live up to what it's been promising to host nations with regard to FCM and the US potential responsiveness. The AMC rep stated that they have a robust capability and can deploy CM forces with sufficient haste. Expectation management is critical, though, but it is important to remember that POTUS decision to assist a host nation trumps all other concerns. A question arose as to when a GCC should transfer from CM to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster relief. This question was unanswered. DOS rep asserted that DOD is not the only responder; nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations and other nations, etc will certainly play a significant role. The Joint Staff rep stated that there's a fine line between Homeland Defense withholdings and helping our friends and allies.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- There are insufficient capabilities in theater to deal with a CBRNE incident at the operational and tactical level. The quick answer is to provide more subject matter expertise / training.
- The GCCs are writing a DOTMLPF Change Recommendation to obtain FCM assets in their Areas of Responsibility.
- As of right now, the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force is a CONUS asset and would not be deployed OCONUS.
- The line between Homeland Defense deficiency and “helping our friends” is very fine and needs to be considered when deploying national level assets for FCM.

DAY 2

Guardian Program

Presenter: COL Mark Malatesta

The Joint Requirements Office (JRO) is the CJCS focal point and staff advocate for all CBRN Defense aspects of combating WMD capabilities in order to advance DOD's ability to combat WMD. The JRO has 5 branches, but the CM branch was the only one discussed during his brief. His team, the CBRN CM Integrated Concept Team "Facilitates/advocates for planning, coordination and oversight of domestic/foreign CBRN CM capabilities". The purpose of the team is to:

- Provide working group for integrated concept development for CBRN CM.
- Assess DOD's capabilities to conduct domestic and foreign CBRN CM operations.
- Review and recommend requirements based on operational capability gaps identified in WMD CM CBA and other analytical efforts.
- Develop concepts for analyzing, identifying potential material and nonmaterial solutions and provide the basis for DOTMLPF Change Recommendations, CDDs and CPDs.

The CBAs are developed from the Initial Capabilities Document, which is derived from the GCC requests for materiel and non-materiel solutions. The WMD CBA identified 55 tasks which must be conducted during CM event, 354 DOD capability gaps against the 55 tasks, and 51 solution sets that could fill capability gaps. The CBRN Consequence Management Initial Capabilities Document will document the requirement to resolve CBRN CM capabilities gaps and is based on the WMD CBA. That document is currently being revised and will be completed after the CBA is adjudicated. In addition, JRO is also going to produce coursework for CBRN CM. JRO is also intimately involved in training and exercises in NORTHCOM, EUCOM, PACOM and STRATCOM.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- JRO is the CJCS focal point and staff advocate for all CBRN Defense.
- The CM branch of JRO will recommend requirements based on operational capability gaps identified in WMD CM CBA and other analytical efforts.
- The WMD CBA identified 55 tasks which must be conducted during a CM event, 354 DOD capability gaps against the 55 tasks, and 51 solution sets that could fill capability gaps.
- That document is currently being revised and will be completed after the CBA is adjudicated.

Joint Capabilities Development for CBRN CM

Presenter: Lt Col Brett Crozier, J-8/JRO CBRN Defense

Lt Col Brett Crozier, J-8, provided a briefing on Joint Capabilities Development for Consequence Management. He began by summarizing the mission of the JRO highlighting its responsibility to facilitate/advocate for planning, coordination and oversight of domestic/foreign CBRN CM capabilities. To that end, they have developed CBRN CM Integrated Concept Teams which develop material and non-material requirements through Capabilities Based Assessments (CBA). Following this explanation of the process, Lt Col Crozier described several current initiatives in field analytics, CBRN survey capabilities, and mass decontamination.

During the Q&A session Lt Col Ricci asked whether the ICD could be expanded to include natural disasters. Lt Col Crozier responded yes, but for natural disasters that result in a CBRN incident. Another participant then asked what the requirements were for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Lt Col Crozier stated that more policy was required to further define the responsibility.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- CBRN CM ICD will document requirements to resolve CBRN CM capabilities gaps based on WMD CM CBA.
- ICD will be completed after CM CBA is adjudicated. Recommendations will include both material (CDDs) and non-material (DCRs) capability development.
- Capabilities Standardization Initiatives include survey capabilities, field analytics, and mass decontamination.

NORTHCOM

Presenter: LTC Cedrick Farris

LTC Cedrick Farris summarized USNORTHCOM's ability to conduct consequence management for the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia. To meet this mission, USNORTHCOM has developed the Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF). Consisting of three force packages, the CCMRF deploys to the base support installation to provide immediate all hazards support. He stated that while each force package has a different capability, training and equipment readiness standards are the same. LTC Farris noted that though the CCMRFs are highly valuable assets, they require a great deal of training. One of the main tasks for the CCMRF moving forward is to address title 10 and title 32 issues to lessen the burden on the reserve troops.

During the Q&A session, Maj Mike Vail asked if there was any potential for the CCMRF to be deployed overseas. LTC Farris replied that no decision has yet been made in that regard. General Miyagi then commented that PACOM operated under the impression that if something occurred in Guam or Hawaii the CCMRF would deploy. This understanding was based on the position of these two regions as OCONUS but part of the United States.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- Deploys immediately in response to a WMD event.
- Three elements provide various levels of Incident site support, medical support and Head Quarters support.
- Faces significant challenges due to rigor of training required from reserve forces.

USSTRATCOM

Presenter: CDR Dan Honken, LTC Jay Hall, Mr. Scott Nelson

CDR Honken began the briefing on the mission of STRATCOM by emphasizing that STRATCOM is not the CWMD warfighter, the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) are the warfighters. STRATCOM efforts are intended to move the COCOMs toward common operations approaches and capabilities solutions that support the National Strategy. The emphasis remains on the Combatant Commanders to translate strategic objectives into something that makes sense in the AOR. Recent STRATCOM CM related initiatives include creating a joint capabilities document roadmap, analyzing current OCONUS CM capabilities, examining the impact of current policy, and drafting a deployable CM operations concept.

During the Q&A session Brian Lewis of the Department of State asked if STRATCOM had examined local Host Nation capabilities. It was answered that there are a wide variety of possible situations and possible allies to turn to. The level of support from the HN will depend on the country. The base assumption is that the HN will help up to a point. Mr. Matrin Bagely then asked if CONUS capabilities were to be taken as a given by the COCOMs for the purpose of planning. It was answered that this is not yet nailed down. It was suggested that plans include a phrase such as “be ready to take CONUS assets if necessary in FCM operations.” LtCol Steele added that the best thing to do is ask. A CCMRF may not always be available, but there are a lot of other CM resources that could be made available.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- USSTRATCOM was assigned as the lead combatant commander for integrating and synchronizing DOD in combating WMD.
- Consequence Management support to partner nations remains an unsettled matter at the national level
- STRATCOM was directed to conduct an informal assessment of capabilities needed by GCC to perform CM mitigation outside of the CONUS
- General Cartwright asked the CDR USSTRATCOM to develop an operations concept for deploying CONUS based CM capabilities overseas

AFRICOM

Presenter: Dr. Andrew Campbell

Dr. Campbell went through a Command 101 brief first. AFRICOM does not operate like other GCCs. They do not have an Area of Responsibility; they have an Area of Activity (AOA). They organize by functional areas, not traditional J-Code directorates. It functions almost like a Joint Interagency Coordination Group and as a CCDR. AFRICOM will strive to empower and train HNs in their AOI. AFRICOM acknowledges the need for host nation stability and nation building in order to do consequence management. That's why they're organized differently than other GCCs; they recognize the need to operate differently to accommodate the different set of challenges in this AOA. The DOS runs a program where American states have a sister relationship with nations in the AFRICOM AOA. Many times, those nations will not interact with AFRICOM, but they will interface with their partner states (e.g.: South Africa and New York).

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- AFRICOM does not operate like other GCCs.
- HNs have limited or no capability to detect CBRN.
- Not only is AFRICOM vulnerable to CBRN attacks (especially considering South Africa is hosting the World Cup), but they are vulnerable to catastrophic releases from TIC/TIM sites.
- AFRICOM wants OSD to let them respond with DOS, eschewing the need for the typical RFA process:
 - o AFRICOM wants to have chopped to them capabilities like CMAT, EMEDS, Tech Escort, etc.

EUCOM Decision Support Tool (DST) (Classified Presentation)

Presenter: Ms. Jessica Iannotti, SAIC

Ms. Jessica Iannotti provided a briefing on EUCOM's Decision Support Tool (DST). The EUCOM DST stems directly from the success of a related effort for US Pacific Command (PACOM) where an automated "playbook" was developed for the PACOM staff to assist them with the exercise Top Officials (TOPOFF) IV in the summer of 2007. The effort to support EUCOM came at the request of EUCOM's J-3, who requested DTRA support in building a DST to help his staff prepare for and execute the foreign consequence management (FCM) mission. The EUCOM DST was designed in PowerPoint and features a series of flowcharts (process diagrams) that depict the FCM response process. It features multiple links that allow the user to immediately access additional information such as reference documents, links on the EUCOM web portal, and DoD doctrine. This product also features a comprehensive electronic library of important response references.

During the Q&A session, when asked who is responsible for updating the DST, Ms. Iannotti explained that the staff element at the COCOM is responsible for updating the

OPR sections and that DTRA can help with technical support, but the COCOM is responsible for adjusting the content. Another question asked was how the tool is validated. Ms. Iannotti responded that the COCOM does validation through general review and a follow on exercise. The final question asked was where the nuclear/biological/chemical messages were in the DST to which Ms. Iannotti replied that they have no notion that they have created the perfect tool and that one immediate goal is to find gaps from the field.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- The EUCOM DST is an all-electronic product that depicts the FCM response process and hyperlinks to supporting information including a reference library.
- Per PACOM, the DST is an incredibly useful tool that puts all the information at your finger tips so you don't have to find it.
- Other COCOMs interested in the tool can contact Mr. Paul Nelson, DTRA. Because the tool is created in PowerPoint, it should be relatively easy to update at the COCOM level.

CENTCOM

Presenter: LTC Frances Chancey

Briefing was classified SECRET.

PACOM

Presenter: Major General Vern T. Miyagi, PACOM

Briefing was classified SECRET.

TRANSCOM

Presenter: Mr. Tim Quinn

Mr. Tim Quinn briefed participants on the role of TRANSCOM in Consequence Management. He began by introducing the three commands: Air Mobility Command, Air Sealift Command, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. He emphasized that while the goal is to optimize the capability, there are tradeoffs in terms of time and cost (Airlift is fast but extremely expensive. Sealift is slow but inexpensive) For CM operations, the concerns are contamination of assets, cleanliness standards, and degraded TPFDD flow. He stated that it is impossible to clean a contaminated aircraft and that there is no way to transport contaminated remains.

During the Q&A period, numerous questions were asked about TRANSCOM's inability to transport contaminated remains. Participants asked about using alternative technologies such as cryogenics or using existing overpack containers. Mr. Quinn replied that many solutions have been proposed, but they generally fail pressure drop tests and

forty foot drop tests. He added that cultural concerns add to the difficulty because the U.S. remains unwilling to resort to cremation and the container must look like a coffin.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- How clean is clean?
- No capability to safely airlift contaminated remains.
- CRAF assets cannot operate in a contaminated zone.

DAY 3

OSD Domestic Consequence Management Program, Policy, Issues

Presenter: Mr. Richard Chavez, OASD(HD&ASA)

Mr. Chavez provided an overview of the OSD Domestic CM Program. He emphasized the movement toward creating a National Plan within the last year through greater integration between the state, local, and Federal authorities. The enablers for the Program are: a common set of objectives through the Integrated Planning System (IPS); and the Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER) which serves as the link between local, state, and Federal entities. He discussed how the National Plans are being created through the established DoD process. He emphasized that the state sets the priorities and the Federal government only provides the support to the state. The Program is also aiming to expand to an “all hazard” response. He noted that one unresolved question is who is in charge during different types of events (terrorist attack, CBRNE incident, accident, pandemic influenza, etc). Finally, Mr. Chavez indicated he was most worried about the medical surge and mass decontamination capabilities.

During the Q&A section Mr. Chavez explained that international assets were being integrated into plans for health and medical issues such as Pandemic Flu, but not for other plans. Another question asked if DoD requirements would be inflated because zero capability is assumed at the state/local levels. Mr. Chavez answered that everything still must go through the official budgeting process and will be overseen. In response to another question Mr. Chavez explained the TFER was still a concept and not yet executed. He also indicated that funding would be an issue for the task force. The final question asked whether there is a prioritized list of critical infrastructure to be saved in the event of an attack. Mr. Chavez explained there are prioritization documents but they are classified.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- The past year was “The Year of the Plan” in terms of creating a more integrated National Response.
- Gaps need to be identified between state/local/Federal authorities and filled.
- Commonality needs to be established within DoD and between state, local, and Federal authorities.
- The lead for different types of incidents needs to be determined.
- Zero capability is assumed at the state/local level because there is no measure of their current capability.

DHS Integrated National Planning for CBRNE Response

Presenter: VADM Roger T. Rufe, Jr., USCG (Ret), Director DHS Operations Directorate

VADM Rufe began by providing an overview of the background documents for national planning. He then explained the system will be built from the ground up because DHS does not have an infrastructure in place like that which exists within the Department of Defense. Because of the lack of infrastructure DHS drew heavily from DoD in building its system. For example, IPS is very similar to Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). So far over 1,000 personnel have been trained through IPS and training will now become mandatory. VADM Rufe also highlighted the Incident Management Planning Team consisting of permanent, on-call subject matter experts in the event of an incident as a part of the planning system. Finally, he emphasized the need to create “jointness” within DHS similar to that within the military services.

During the Q&A session, VADM Rufe reiterated that the TFER was still conceptual and not yet operational. One military officer referred to the lack of requirements and asked whether the DoD requirements thus far were on target in terms of what support DHS requires. VADM Rufe indicated he was unsure and recognized the need for a formal process to identify gaps and budget to fill those gaps.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- The Planning System within DHS draws heavily from the existing DoD system.
- DHS should build a “Joint Staff” capability within its Department mirroring the DoD system.
- In order for requirements to be on target, gaps must be identified and solutions put into the budget.

Role of 415th Chemical Brigade in Domestic Response

Presenter: BG James T. Cook, CDR 415th Chemical Brigade

BG Cook provided an overview of the 415th role in response beginning with its mission statement and area of responsibility. He then discussed the Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) mission. The unit responding to an incident within the first 48 hours is the CIRF. The CIRF can be a light or heavy unit depending on the needs of the situation. BG Cook pointed out the training challenge, especially in terms of reserve force availability. Despite this difficulty, they must meet a 1 October standup date. During an incident, a CM Unit, with broad knowledge extending beyond chemical needs, will link with the 415th to provide enhanced validation expertise. Finally, BG Cook discussed the Red Dragon 2008 and 2009 exercises, the latter of which will focus on deployment strategies as well as test the CIRF units.

In the Q&A session, BG Cook answered affirmatively that the Brigade would be augmented with different units in the event of a mass fatality incident. Another question

asked whether the unit would be fenced. BG Cook stated it would and therefore would not be used for other positions.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- The 415th Chemical Brigade operates in support of civil authorities, not in the lead.
- Finding and training the required personnel will be a challenge.
- Keeping the reserve forces after they are trained could also prove difficult, especially as they may have conflicts with their job.

DOE Consequence Management

Presenter: Mr. Dave Young, DOE

Mr. Young explained he was focusing his discussion on the radiological/nuclear portion of consequence management. He provided an overview of the mission, authorities, roles and responsibilities of DOE in consequence management of a domestic nuclear/radiological event. DOE would not only provide expert advice, but is also expected to have deployable capabilities. Mr. Young discussed recent exercises in which the DOE was involved such as TOPOFF and lessons learned from those events. During an event:

- The National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) would provide plume modeling and initial diagnostics within an hour after detonation.
- The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) is usually the first group on the ground from DOE and is considered a “jack of all trades.” They are concerned with the health and safety of the public and environment. They respond on a regional basis and should deploy within two to four hours of notification.
- The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) team provides medical consultation, usually in a reach back capacity, but can also deploy.
- The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) will provide monitoring and assessment capabilities. Initially it has been staffed and equipped by DOE Consequence Management Response Teams (CMRT) but the full FRMAC will include the interagency and help to build the common operating procedure. The EPA will eventually take over the leadership of the FRMAC.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- Interagency coordination needs to be worked on for a coherent response.
- Products that are more user-friendly and less technical need to be produced for the “layman” (non-technical expert) to use in the field.

USARNORTH Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/ Defense Coordinating Element (DCE)

Presenter: Mr. Paul Jensen, Region III DCE

Mr. Jensen provided an overview of the roles and responsibilities of the ARNORTH DCO/DCE for domestic consequence management. He explained the DCO are aligned with the ten FEMA regions and there is a permanently assigned DOD representative in each FEMA region to plan, coordinate, and integrate Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) with local, state and federal agencies. The service has also linked its backup plan with FEMA. The DCE has been increased from a seven-man element to a ten-man. The Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) will brief the DoD installation commander on the day-to-day mission for the service and will deploy in the occurrence on an event. In the occurrence of an event, DCE will deploy between 21-25 personnel, although that number is flexible. Mr. Jensen highlighted the equipment used by the teams. He stated the capabilities package is small and can be overwhelmed with information during an event or exercise. Finally, he explained the chain of command and order of operations for an actual event.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- There is alignment between FEMA response and service response.
- ARNORTH will have to be augmented by other military divisions during an event.
- The small capabilities package may be overwhelmed by the amount of information during an event, particularly on the SIPR-side.

National Guard Bureau

Presenter: LTC Molbert, USA NBG HQ

NGB is located in 3,300 locations in 2,700 communities; LTC Molbert considers this a demonstration of NGB being forward deployed for a domestic incident. The majority of their work in consequence management has been under Title 32 status, not Title 10. Despite the large deployments for the global war on terrorism (GWOT), at least 50% remain for homeland defense. In this capacity, NGB serves to fill the gap between local response and Title 10 response. The WMD Civil Support Teams (CST) are fully funded and under state control requiring them to comply with civilian standards. Teams have a mobile analytical lab and a unified command suite linked to both civilian and military communications. WMD CST is undergoing a spiral development process where technologies are developed and fielded within two years. CST personnel need 12-18 months of specialized training. Thus far, CSTs have responded to over 500 real world incidents.

During the Q&A session, LTC Molbert was asked whether CST could operate overseas. He responded this was still not approved by congress and could be seen as a loss to US capabilities if troops were OCONUS, although there are some training missions with Mexico and Canada. When asked about the training for CRFP, LTC Molbert explained it

was a mobile training team because it was too expensive and time consuming to have one location.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- NGB operates under civilian control and is never the lead.
- CST acts as a force multiplier until the Federal government steps in.
- They must comply with civilian standards.
- Significant training is required making retention an important issue.
- Communications have improved with the Federal response entities and the command suite allows for communications with both civilian and military partners.

Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) FBI

Presenter: Mr. Jon Froehlich, FBI CMU

The speaker provided an overview of the authorities and mission of the FBI DEST. He explained that the Team worked in coordination with DHS and supporting agencies. The Team numbers can vary depending on the threat and should deploy within 4 hours to the scene. The speaker then explained there was a difference between the WMD unit and the HAZMAT team. The former provides the asset coordination for an event. The latter provides the traditional scientific experts.

There was one question regarding procuring authority to fly in the airspace over an incident site. The speaker explained FAA coordinates the airspace, but FBI could help with the coordination process. For exercises it is more difficult to get the authority because it could disrupt air traffic, but during an event this would not be an issue.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- The call out process is well established and documented.
- Communications between the FBI, DoD, and DHS have been established for en-route and on-scene.
- Each FBI element brings specialized equipment for the event, therefore sustain operations are independent of one another.

Breakout Session 1: Role of ARNORTH

Presenter: LTC Terrance Allen, CBRN Officer ARNORTH

LTC Allen provided an overview of ARNORTH and its involvement in domestic consequence management. He highlighted communications packages such as the sentinel and super sentinel mobile command center. He also discussed the Army Surety Program and CAIRA (Chemical Accident Incident Response and Assistance) in particular. LTC Allen then posed a number of questions to the group for consideration and discussion. The questions that generated the most discussion are:

- Should the Army/DoD plan to respond to an on-post munitions incident with off-post effects?
 - o One group member stated that if the incident is only on-post, it is not an ARNORTH issue.
 - o Another pointed to an incident that occurred in the early 1990s in DC where an old military munition was discovered off-post. He suggested ARNORTH look at the lessons learned from that incident because DoD was active in the response.
- Should NORTHCOM have a role in an off-post catastrophic incident with a US military chemical agent?
 - o One member explained that NORTHCOM would definitely have a role and should be the on-scene commander.
 - o Another stated NORTHCOM should be the liaison between the follow-on defense resources for cleanup as it was a DoD weapon.
 - o Another member believed DoD was only responsible for a monetary contribution, not providing a capability.
- What is the role of DoD response elements in support of CAIRA response?
 - o The group did not have an answer to this question, but one member stated a Task Force has been stood up to examine this issue and an answer should be available soon.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- A main problem is that ARNORTH has no assigned forces.
- ARNORTH is still nascent and has a number of unanswered questions in terms of roles and responsibilities in operations.
- There may be some contention when dealing with state/local authorities, for example they may want to conduct their own assessments rather than rely on the service to determine level of contamination.

Breakout Session 2: Future of DoD CBRN Consequence Management

Moderator: LtCol Brett Crozier (JS J8 JRO)

LtCol Crozier presented participants with three topics for discussion. He first addressed sourcing needs for the CCMRF, stating that he would like to get the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to share some of the burden. Title 10 and Title 32 issues were also discussed but without reaching a consensus. Lt Col Crozier then moved to discuss using homeland assets for OCONUS CM. He acknowledged the need to provide the Combatant Commanders with planning assumptions and reiterated the lack of clear policy. He finally addressed the future of the JTACE. He mentioned the possibility of moving it to Joint Forces Command but did not seem to think this was an optimal solution. Many members voiced their concern that the JTACE provided the same capability as a CMAT making it a redundant asset.

Key Issues:

- CCMRF sourcing requires greater participation from the other forces.

- Policy needed to outline the use of homeland assets in OCONUS CM.
- Need to ensure that the JTACE is not a redundant capability.

Panel Discussion: Establishment of a CBRN CM ASI for DoD Personnel

Moderator: LTC Alicia GB Smith

In compliance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-5, the Air Force (USAF) determined that there was a growing need for credentialing emergency managers. The Air Force Certified Emergency Manager (AFCEM) program provides a standardized path for attaining Profession Certification (CEM) in addition to the International Association of Emergency Managers – Certified Emergency Manager (IAEM CEM) certification. The program provides AFCEMs greater alignment with their civilian counterparts and allows them to transition to a civilian position more seamlessly. The USAF's goal is to create baseline levels of training and expertise for EM and CBRN defense as well as a career path within the USAF and the Department of Defense (DoD) for this career field.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- The cost of IAEM membership and certification are not currently covered by the program. This could make it financially difficult for people to obtain these requirements.
- There needs to be greater levels of linkage with other departments for training. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and each state offer their own training and exercises that could be beneficial to the development of the AFCEM program.
- There is a lack of a common framework for personnel training, development and requirement standards across the DoD. Certifications that these programs offer lack cohesion.
- A greater emphasis needs to be placed throughout the training on developing expertise in management and planning.
- The transition from a first line CBRN responder to an emergency manager is a good progression for training and experience development. Allows for people to build on their knowledge and experience to respond more effectively.

COA 1: Research availability of USAF funding to cover the cost associated with membership and certification. Negotiate with IAEM to offer a fee waiver or cheaper military/DoD fee.

COA 2: Continue to work towards developing a career path for a career field in emergency management. This may include increasing the amount of training for emergency managers. Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) is looking at adding coursework in this area.

COA 3: USAF is willing to be the executive agent for creating a DoD certified emergency manager program. DoD program would capture all Consequence Management (CM) certifications that are offered. This would allow an even greater level of standardization. US Marine Corps (USMC) has agreed to support this task.

COA 4: Future USAF working group on AFCEM program will examine these issues in greater detail.