

**Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
Consequence Management Conference
8-10 June 2010**

Conference Summary

Executive Summary

The Sixth Annual Department of Defense (DoD) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Consequence Management (CM) Conference was held 8-10 June 2010 at the Heritage Conference Center in Chantilly, VA. It was hosted by The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Approximately 205 participants and presenters attended the conference making it the highest level of participation since it began back in 2005.

The goals of this year's conference were for key members of the community to establish a working rapport with other DOD and interagency partners and to exchange information on the challenges of multi-agency response. The first day was devoted to "CM Policy" while the second and third day's discussions focused on "Domestic and foreign consequence management."

Each day began with a keynote address and concluded with a panel discussion pertaining to that day's theme. Day one's keynote speaker, Mr. Rich Chavez, Acting Director, Operations Coordination and Planning of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), focused on a strategic view of the Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions and offered perspectives on where the current administration may be going. The CM panel discussed *Exploring the Differences in Interagency Planning and Response of CM*. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator, Honorable W. Craig Fugate opened with a keynote address on day two focusing on Resiliency and planning for future responses. Day two's panel discussion was on *Domestic Response*. The Honorable Andrew Weber, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear & Chemical & Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) provided a keynote address on day three. He provided key insight into the future of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction which will help focus work on building CM capability throughout the United States and with its partners. The topic for the day three panel was *CM/Humanitarian Assistance (HA)/Disaster Relief (DR) – Differences in Response*. A full summary of the topics can be found below.

The following conference objectives were achieved:

- Provide a professional forum for CBRN Consequence Management decision makers and planners
- Discuss how DoD supporting organizations can provide better integrated skill set to Domestic (DHS) and Foreign (Department of State (DOS)) lead agencies during CBRN CM events
- Share program experiences, develop solutions to common challenges, and gain a deeper understanding of capabilities, limitations, and challenges faced by all

Sincere appreciation is extended to all conference presenters for the quality and content of their presentations. Sincere thanks to all attendees for your active participation, discussion, questions, and suggestions.

Anyone wishing to comment or offer suggestions regarding the attached conference summary – especially the presenters – are invited to submit comments to darrin.flick@dtra.mil, who may also be reached at 703-767-4394.

8 June 2010

Opening Remarks

The 2010 CM Conference opened with Color Guard and the playing of our National Anthem. Conference participants were welcomed by conference organizers and the first day began with administrative remarks, regarding the Heritage Center and the conference overall. Another speaker seconded the welcome, challenged conference participants to candidly identify issues and seek solutions, and introduced the day's keynote speaker.

Keynote Address

The keynote address focused on a strategic view of the Homeland Security and Homeland Defense missions and offered some perspectives on where the current administration may be going. The theme of the speaker's brief was "Safety, Security, Resilience." The speaker discussed his experience with the Department of Defense (DOD), where he worked on issues "to the right of boom" and contrasted that with his experience at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), where he and his personnel have focused on the prevent and protect side of the continuum. He discussed his grown appreciation for the CBRN/WMD threat against the United States and the shadowy nature of that threat both at home and abroad, and underscored the importance of the CM mission. The key understanding the speaker wanted to address was that the threat is out there and the question is not if, but when. Terrorists have the means, motive, and opportunity.

The speaker went on to discuss some of the major challenges that the U.S. faces with regards to this threat, including the synchronization and integration of federal, state, and local efforts and the evolution of a whole-of-government response. State and Local (S&L) planning needs to progress further but not much progress has been made and the Federal government needs to serve as a greater force for cohesion, he said. He elaborated on the challenge of coordination, noting that, while DOD has the SCC-WMD to coordinate CM efforts, the Federal government lacks an analogous office, which results in multiple agencies having overlapping responsibilities. In general, there needs to be a more concerted effort for DOD and DHS to interface to better leverage expertise and assets.

During the questions and answer period, the speaker discussed some of the efforts that have been made on S&L plans development, including DHS' Task Force Readiness. Plans development has been slowed, he added, because resources for planning have to compete with resources for other competing needs and many S&L opt to address their present day needs instead of plans. The speaker also elaborated on the nature of the terrorist threat and spoke about the responsibility that municipalities and owners of critical infrastructure have to defend their assets and installations for cyber attack.

Key Issues / Takeaways:

- While less likely than a conventional attack, a WMD event would be more devastating, especially psychologically
- Roughly 90% of response is the same for all-hazards. Only 10% accounts for specialized materiel, training, and processes/procedures specific to CBRN. Having special protection, etc. makes it a more difficult mission, besides having to be mindful of secondary/follow-on attacks.
- Cyberspace is being included in considerations of these kind of attacks, as the loss of communications and other infrastructures on which we rely would be devastating in a response to a catastrophic incident
- The speaker questioned whether responders could evacuate an entire city if required.
- Internet can be a source of vulnerability and can be used by our adversaries. Plans need to compensate for that threat.
- Threat is difficult to observe. We may not see terrorists coming. Our luck will eventually run out and that is why CM is so important: how do we respond?
- DHS is charged with incident response by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5. The Federal Bureau of Investigations has the statutory responsibility under Title 18 to investigate crimes. Sometimes these parallel responsibilities can create friction, since in the process of responding to an incident, evidence can be ruined.
- HSPD 8 is currently under review. There are major problems with it because it only applies to federal Departments and Agencies. It needs to apply to S&L responders as well.

CM Panel – Exploring the Differences in Interagency Planning and Response of CM

The facilitator introduced the three panelists, who represented three different federal agencies and established that the purpose of the panel was to highlight key interagency actors in CM, through a policy lens. Given that focus, the facilitator explained the four questions that the panelists had been given in advance to help shape their presentations. The questions are as follows:

- How does your organization understand CM and how does it define CM? What are the views of your leadership and how is CM resourced in your organization? What is the priority of CM?
- With regards to policy, what are the key aspects of CM? What are the differences with partners and what are the barriers? How does your organization view concepts in the interagency?

- With regards to planning, how does your organization plan for CM and what are the linkages to interagency response? What are the capabilities and short falls and how do you exercise, train, and educate?
- What does the way-ahead look like? How do you think about continuing current initiatives and starting new ones? What are the near, mid, and long term plans or vision for your organization? Is the CM community on the right track and are there deficiencies?

Following the introduction of these questions, the first panelist spoke from their perspective within the Department of Defense on a policy initiative that their office has undertaken to bolster partner capacity building activities through the geographic combatant commands (GCC) that would strengthen the countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) capabilities of critical partners and key supporting partners of the U.S. Those CWMD capabilities would include CM as well as interdiction. This CWMD Defense Initiative would seek to provide the GCCs with money to support regional CWMD partnerships, which can be tailored to the GCC's area of responsibility (AOR), and could include anything from capability assessments to research, development, and training and education. While the idea is new and in an early stage of development, the timeline in short and an out brief of the initiative will occur at the Global Sync conference with an issue paper to follow shortly after.

The next panelist's presentation covered three areas from a Department of State (DOS) perspective. The first was his organization's capability and readiness, illustrated by the example of a past operation, where a foreign consequence management (FCM) team was ready to depart with little notice in response to a falling U.S. satellite with hazardous materials inside of it should it have fallen into the territory of another nation. The second part defined FCM from a DOS perspective: an international event, involving CBRN contaminant, with a request for and approval of USG support, with the purpose to mitigate the loss of life. FCM is not all hazards, nor is it humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), CWMD in general, or long term assistance and recovery. He concluded with an overview of the FCM mission, including pre-event and post-event activities, current international engagements, and the major challenges, including coordinating pre-event activities in the interagency and interagency and intergovernmental communications.

The final panelist provided a general overview of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and how the organization responds to incidents, emphasizing the all-hazards approach that FEMA takes and their director's intent to stabilize an emergency in the first 72 hours. Additionally, he discussed some of the new initiatives on which FEMA is working, including adding mitigate to the prepare, protect, respond, and recover continuum, and he outlined the way-ahead for FEMA.

The following discussion and question and answer period touched on many issues. Interagency coordination remains a challenge, although DOS is currently working on a database to coordinate interagency efforts and utilize federal resources with another nation. While there is an office that does CM and critical infrastructure protection within

the National Security Staff, there is not a specific office dedicated to FCM or partner capacity building. Whole community planning that leverages capability across an entire community (including private, NGO, and S&L) is another key component of coordinating CM efforts. Federal Coordinating Officers have been identified to prepare and lead a CM response and those relationships have led to better synchronization. Interagency input into DOD and GCC plans are another initiative to bring about a greater unity of effort. In terms of partner capacity building, DOS may be coordinating activities but it does not mean that it is doing all of them, including capabilities assessments.

Limited utility was seen in prepositioning FCM assets for no-notice events, although both DOS and DOD predeploy for high profile events. On the domestic side, FEMA has dispersed resources across the nation and regional offices function semi-autonomously to ensure needed assets and control are as close to a potential emergency as possible.

Key Issues / Takeaways

- FEMA is developing a new way of evaluating/reporting on state and local capability, similar to the Target Capabilities List (TCL), but moved to a higher level: the focus of this system would be what a jurisdiction needs to do in the first 72 hours. They will flesh out preparedness goals and system as they move ahead.
- This capability list for the first 72 hours will be the backbone for a new planning system, which will have an all hazards approach (not incident specific).
- Their planning goal is to look at the “maximum of maximums.” They will build out Meta-scenarios (not incident specific), from which they can establish a baseline.
- The FCM Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is being cleared in interagency. It will explain agency roles in FCM and will create a foundational understanding of what the responsibilities of each department and agency are in an FCM event.
- The FCM MOU is currently getting the planner level chop in the interagency now. It will go to the NSC/NSS next for a formal chop.
- Language stands in the way of better coordination and there is a need to better define what “mitigate” and “resiliency” mean across the whole of government.
- NATO resources can be leveraged for partner capability assessments. NATO CEP has an experienced pool of SMEs and will pay for those experts to go to the country and perform the assessment. From there, the nation decides if they want to release that assessment and to whom.

Capstone Threat Assessment

Briefing was classified SECRET/NOFORN

9 June 2010

Vermont National Guard Domestic Response Perspective

Responding to the CM Conference’s opening remarks, which challenged participants to identify issues and solutions, the presenter decided that he would not use his original

brief, which provided an overview of state structures, processes, assets, and potential issues. Instead, he spoke on the issue that he described as the highest priority challenge facing domestic response: the integration of civilian and military capabilities for domestic operations. He outlined two perspectives that frame the conversation over how unity of effort between civil-military assets should occur: the federal and DOD perspective and the S&L perspective. The federal perspective sees States as having failed to develop in-depth CBRN plans that identify their expectations of the federal government, failing to share those plans with each other, and with struggling with political turnover and new leadership that may not appreciate the threat of CBRN. The State perspective fears a federal takeover of State response assets and the dilution of Governors' control over areas where they believe they are more qualified: at home, in their State.

He outlined the recent history conflict between these two views, with DOD unsuccessfully seeking the ability to federalize Title 32 in every National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) since 2007, while the newly established Council of Governors has grown in organization, recently establishing several working groups, including one on unity of effort. The result of this history is that there is a lack of trust between DOD and state Governors that could potentially impact how Governors respond to an event and what requests for assistance they might make to the DOD. To that end, the presenter outlined five initiatives that could improve unity of effort, outlined below, and stressed that the U.S. cannot wait until an event to try to solve the integration issue between Title 10, Title 32, and S&L resources.

Key Issues / Takeaways:

- The federal government needs to develop protocols allowing state governors to control Title 10 assets, within DOD discretion, in a way that would not limit DOD's authority to direct Title 10 forces
- Dual status should be given to an Incident Commander for a no-notice event
- Both Federal and State governments should develop structures or processes to enable the success of the first two, including integrating Title 10 staff and state staff for JTF-HQ.
- States owe DOD more detailed plans and CONOPS including likely requests for capabilities. That will allow DOD to create better plans.
- State governors agree to make National Guard forces a call-up option to DOD, although it wouldn't give the Secretary of Defense authority over those assets

Local Response Perspectives

The presenter began his presentation by highlighting the need for all levels of government to communicate effectively with each other. A federal understanding of S&L capabilities must be based on the recognition that they differ from area to area and from function to function. The New York Fire Department (FDNY) is not a baseline for S&L capabilities, he explained, but an aberration. He spoke about the S&L need for better intelligence from the federal government on the threats that they face. He continued by characterizing the benefits of the regional response approach that Northern Virginia (NOVA) implements, in which units from neighboring communities respond to incidents

in proximate jurisdictions on anything from a routine incident to an abnormal one. Along those lines, NOVA has developed regional plans, including those for mass casualty and WMD incidents. The presenter finished with an assessment of the gaps and constraints that affect CM capabilities, both in general and under the given scenario of the day.

Key Issues / Takeaways:

- NOVA's regional response is not the standard for response in the U.S. In Kansas City, units from Kansas may not cross into Missouri and vice versa. Parochialism is a problem.
- Economic constraints mean that departments are not resourced for daily missions, let alone catastrophic, abnormal ones. If a WMD event occurs, departments will do the best they can.
- Legal authorities need to make mutual aid agreements easier to establish. It took the Intelligence Reform and Terror prevention Act of 2004 to make good MOUs.
- S&Ls have no confidence they will get necessary intelligence regarding imminent threats from the federal government. Lack of information means that departments are making educated guesses. They need to know if they have the right equipment, medical interventions, etc.
- Federal agencies need to involve S&Ls in their planning, especially with regards to discussions relating to first responders.
- Host departments develop radiological/nuclear plans but 70% of department personnel are volunteers. They need federal guidance on response standards and more guidance. A single agency must gather guidance and disseminate it to the first responder community.
- There is a lack of education, awareness, and training on radiological/nuclear among first responders that lead to a decreased willingness to respond to those threats.

Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)

The presenter provided a thorough explanation of the history, mission, organization, and CONOPS of the CBIRF. CBIRF, whose mission is to respond to CBRNE incidents to assist in the conduct of CM operations, is organized into two ~130 person incident response forces (IRF), with one under a 24-hour alert and the other deployable 48 hours from notice. He stressed that CBIRF is a life-saving organization and outlined the capabilities that CBIRF brings to the mission, the tasks CBIRF might perform, and the training and partnerships CBIRF utilizes to achieve their mission.

Key Issues / Takeaways:

- CBIRF can detect and ID 200,000 toxic industrial chemicals, all known chemical warfare agents, 8 biological agents, and alpha, beta, gamma, neutron, and x-ray emissions. They can also collect bio samples for lab analysis
- CBIRF is capable of search and extraction as well as medical care in the hotzone for approximately 50 critical or 100 moderate patients.

- CBIRF can conduct force protection decontamination (30-45 persons per hour) as well as ambulatory (200-225 per hour) and non-ambulatory (65-75 per hour) decontamination.
- CBIRF is capable of technical rescue for confined space and trench rescue, vehicle/equipment extrication, and collapsed structures, as well as explosive ordinance disposal (EOD)
- CBIRF partners with at least eight other nations and first responders in the U.S. to increase operational readiness.

Overview of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium

In his presentation, the presenter described the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC), which was established by Congress through a FEMA grant in 1998 to prepare the nation and its first responders through training and education. He provided an overview of the seven member institutions that comprise the NDPC and the specialized, non-overlapping training that each provides, before focusing on his own institution, the National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT) at Louisiana State University (LSU). Finally, the presenter turned his presentation over to one of NCBRT's instructors, who highlighted seven of the courses that the NCBRT offers.

Key Issues / Takeaways:

- NDPC trained 1.5 million responders last year.
- The seven NDPC members and their specialties are:
 - o Center for Domestic Preparedness (X);
 - o NCBRT (*law enforcement, biological, food defense, and agricultural*);
 - o National Center for Emergency Response in Surface Transportation (*railways, freight and passenger rail response*);
 - o National Disaster Preparedness Training Center (*natural hazards, urban planning, and economic recovery*);
 - o National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center (*emergency medical services, incident management, critical infrastructure protection*);
 - o New Mexico Tech Energetic Research and Testing Center (*information technology, homeland security, energetic material engineering, and petroleum recovery*); and
 - o NNSA/Counter Terrorism Operations Support (*radiation detection and identification, HAZMAT, and WMD responder operations*).
- NDPC training is free of charge to U.S. citizens and most is mobile training.
- NDPC offers three levels of training, based on prior knowledge and seniority.
- NDPC offers online courses as well as train-the-trainer courses. They offer material support to those trainers to teach those courses to others in the future.
- Course development is rigorous; it requires 18 months of effort and three different independent evaluations before becoming certified.

Domestic Response Panel

In preparation for the panel, the five panelists were asked to prepare their thoughts on critical lessons learned, possibilities for interagency integration, challenges their organization faces, and which CBRN hazard is the most worrisome. The facilitator opened up the session by asking the panelists to discuss which CBRN hazard concerns their organization most. Discussion initially focused on response to a nuclear or biological attack or incident, with one panelist raising the problem of continuing operations with a loss of personnel, potentially for years to come. Nuclear power plants and radiological accidents, with potential border issues was a concern to another panelist. Chemical hazards were a priority to a third panelist, who cited potential resource limitations of his area of responsibility (AOR) and tyranny of time and distance as factors in his consideration. Conversation pivoted with the final panelist's response, who stated that the greatest hazard is that which breaks the U.S. system. He continued to speak on the need for initiatives building resiliency in the U.S. population

The facilitator next queried where panelists would allocate their resources, were they to be given unlimited funding. Panelist responses were varied. National resiliency and building symbiotic relationships on a local level was once more identified as a high priority, as was capability assessments and training. Mitigating the CBRN threat through countering WMD initiatives, including better securing fissile material outside of the U.S., increased detection capability, and research to bolster human resistance to biological pathogens was also prioritized highly. In addition, one panelist proposed a redefinition of the interoperability issue regarding communications systems, stating that the current focus on universalizing technologies ignores the reality that responders do what their chain-of-command tells them to do. Given that fact, the lesson from 9/11 is not necessarily universal radio frequencies but an improved decision matrix to enable commanders and protect personnel.

Other topics of discussion included: how panelists' organizations assess capability and design exercises to test desired outcomes; the ideal lessons learned process and the current short-comings in meeting that ideal; difficulties with information sharing and classification; and how to increase the preparedness level of the individual American household.

Key Issues / Takeaways:

- FEMA is developing a meta-scenario which does not consider a single hazard. The scenario involves securing an impacted area of 3,000 square miles, medical treatment for 250,000 injured, and mortuary affairs for 190,000.
- The purpose of the meta-scenario is to break the system and force a deep look at private assets and partners to engender a national capability to respond.
- FEMA's new response objective is to create a system in which all emergency needs are met in the first 72 hours.
- Domestic Resiliency Group (DRG) is working on building a public awareness campaign, with the objective of inculcating mission objectives into public to help in response.
- Lessons learned that are not implemented into future exercises and planning are not learned, they are only observed.

- National Level Exercises are only the end result of a process that is intended to build relationships. It is that process that is the most important part of exercise execution.
- At 30% below normal personnel coverage, operational capability is seriously degraded. A 10% loss can be covered. Personnel begin to fall behind at 20%.
- Fusion centers have made sharing of classified information better, but responder on the street needs to get more information. S&Ls have no confidence they will get the information they need.
- State NG personnel and local responder personnel, many of whom are also guardsmen, must be deconflicted. It does not make sense to take responders away from incident site and send them back in a different uniform.

10 June 2010

FCM Way-ahead from the DOS Perspective

The presentation began by recapping where we left off from the panel discussion, which included the DOS representative and a DOD and FEMA representatives. DOS rep addressed his agenda and the authorities under DOS leads the whole of government response to a FCM event. The first item was how FCM would work in a real world environment. He detailed the FCM Task Force composition and how the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) and the Consequence Management Support Team (CMST) are sourced from this task force. Once the CMST or the FEST is requested / dispatched, it collocates with the Embassy Emergency Action Committee (EAC). The first priority of the EAC is to take care of US citizens. The secondary priority is to advise the impacted nation. The process for a HN to request and validating that request for CBRN assistance is analogous to the Joint Directorate of Military Support process: a HN articulates a need and the US Government determines whether it can help.

According to NSPD 17, DOS coordinates the response and the HN is in charge. While there is no one international body that can perform this coordination function, there are international bodies that coordinate assistance at the regional level; the EADRCC is one example. It could be argued that the UN is the best-suited organization to do this mission and that the UN OCHA could perform the function that the Federal Coordinating Officer performs domestically. The problem is that they don't plan for this type of event. So, the US government works with the affected nation to facilitate regional partnerships, since it will be difficult to martial an effective FCM response in the required timelines.

To the "left of boom", the DOS coordinates pre-event activities – the FCM working group, which coordinates the USG MOU, the FCM Response Framework, conditions for success, and the WMD-T engagement catalogue. The MOU and Framework establish how the interagency work together to complement the HN response and codifies the DOS as lead and how they conduct FCM. The FCM framework is a working level document that will be worked at the action officer level. The conditions for success packet highlights response requirements for a HN, analogous to the DHS Targeted Capabilities List. The WMD-T engagement catalogue records all USG CM engagement activities, so that they can effectively coordinate the pre-event activities.

The event coordination in the Pacific Rim is intended to bridge the tyranny of time and distance by building regional partnership in the PACOM AOR. The PACOM AOR is the next area for major partner building capacity for the DOS.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- How FCM works in a real crisis, with the DOS as the coordinating agency
- DOS is currently working a number of pre-event activities to strengthen the partner and US response capacity
- The next major area that DOS is going to work on building partner capacity is in the Pacific Rim.

CJCSI Update

JS personnel are required to annually review all directives. During that review, this directive was determined to need to be rewritten, since it failed to address the addition of a potential new mission for DOD to “lead” the CM response effort. Moreover, since CJCSI 3110.16 was cancelled, 3214.01C had to incorporate CBRNE capability reporting requirements. In addition to the above, it had to accurately reflect the organizational changes in OSD and clarify terminology related to the FCM mission. JS rep detailed the timeline that 3214.01C will undergo. He also reviewed the questions that the JSAP prompted the community to review. The major changes in the directive are as follows:

- Re-titled CJCSI 3214.01D (Military Assistance vice Support)
- Revised Applicability
 - o Adds CBRN CM Concurrent with military operations
 - o Instances with no DOS established diplomatic presence
 - o Doesn't apply to Installations (See DODIs 2000.18 & 6055.17)
 - o Clarifies that it doesn't apply to naturally occurring endemic or emerging infectious diseases
 - o Only applies to CBRN on foreign soil (no “E”)
- Revised Facts
 - o Clarifies types of DoD support to include activities that facilitate the provision of assistance by others
- Interagency Coordination
 - o Added Interagency FCM WG
 - o Added Joint Staff responsibilities
- Policy (Enclosure A)
 - o Added U.S. Government FCM Goals and Objectives
 - o Added guidance for “Other military CBRN CM assistance operations”
 - o Updated “Immediate response” guidance
 - o Updated “DOD Mission Statement”
 - o Updated Phase 0 guidance
- Roles and Responsibilities
 - o Added CBRN CM capabilities reporting requirement (from CJCSI 3110.16) for Services, GCCs, DTRA
 - o Added requirement to provide CBRN CM technical advice and assistance SMEs
 - o Revised GCC planning requirements (FCM & Other CBRN CM)
 - o Revised GCC coordination, liaison, and CCIR requirements (Deleted “FCM DCO”)
 - o Added requirement for annual update of FCM-related preparedness, response, and other engagement activities
 - o Deleted “JTACE” and moved “advice & assistance” to DTRA
 - o Added definitions (CBRN Advice & Assistance, FCM, Host Nation)

There are multiple concurrent activities that may influence the direction of this directive. Among them include:

- JP 3-41 revision
- Restructured CBRN CM Response Force (CCMRF)
- CBRN CM ICD CWMD
- Global Synchronization Conference Inter-Departmental FCM MOU,
- FCM Response Framework.

The Joint Staff will not make a CM functional area; services will have to build capability from the existing functional areas. The services have struggled to build a capability since they do not know what they will be doing. Once the JCS can tell the Services what they will be doing, then they can build a force structure. This instruction will designate no forces for FCM

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- CM will not be a functional area; the services have to train and equip for FCM out of the existing functional areas
- Multiple concurrent activities may shape the direction of 3214.01C.

CENTCOM Country Assessments

Briefing was classified SECRET.

Strategic Global Assessments

Briefing was classified SECRET.

Warsaw Initiative Fund

The presentation began by discussing the background of the Warsaw Initiative Program (WIP). The WIP began in 1994 when Bill Clinton first announced the program in Warsaw. This program is primarily concerned with activities that build national, regional, and NATO / Euro-Atlantic capacities, interoperability and civil-military cooperation for enhanced preparedness, response to emergencies and support to operations. The pot of money in OSP for the program is currently \$30 million.

The objectives for the program are to support and enable NATO and partner EP/CM capacities for operations and support to other nations. In addition, they want to facilitate U.S. and partner interoperability and integration with NATO Civil Emergency Planning. Finally, he wants to Link the WIF program EP/CM activities with NATO Civil Emergency Planning.

Finally, the topic of Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) was discussed. CEP is the lead for improving national preparedness for CBRN and coordinating NATO consequence management. Their mission and resources support all three pillars of new CBRN Comprehensive Policy. CEP supports policy through contributions to: protection of population & territory; Consequence Management capacities; Civil-Military cooperation; Missile Defense Consequence of intercept; Critical Infrastructure Protection; and cooperation with partners.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- CEP is an overlooked and under used tool, however, CEP has the capability to improve strategic resilience, interoperability and civil-military cooperation in support of NATO CBRN Comprehensive Policy and related priorities. CEP can also help foster sustainable regional cooperation for emergencies.

Civil Military Emergency Preparedness (CMEP) Update

The CMEP program helps to increase Inter-ministerial collaboration within and between governments in the field of national and international emergency planning and preparedness. CMEP fosters the skills and capabilities all countries need to achieve their security objectives and to meet the consequence management expectations of their citizens following disaster events. The CMEP program designs and manages bilateral and multilateral activities to achieve our partner's security cooperation objectives. CMEP strives to increase civil and military cooperation in emergency management and disaster planning, and emphasizes planning for the consequences of all hazards disasters (natural, technological and use of weapons of mass destruction [WMD]). CMEP examines existing capabilities, identifies areas of need, and designs appropriate activities to increase our partners' disaster-planning and response capabilities. The mission involves both supporting inter-ministerial relations within countries and government to government coordination and cooperation across borders.

CMEP is seeking to support international, partner national and regional strategies relating to disaster preparedness and consequence management. They want to create reliable civil-military planning processes that are interoperable and sustainable by the partners using internet applications. In addition, CMEP is attempting to facilitate multi-national ("regional") disaster preparedness and response cooperation with international and nongovernmental organizations.

CMEP has seen many positive results including: greater resilience to respond to all hazards; building of regional networks of emergency/disaster agencies and responders; improved civil-military cooperation; enhanced knowledge and skills of Partners and USACE Emergency Management personnel; experienced civilian and military emergency planners; transfer of useful technologies including GIS; and enhanced planning by Partners with regional groups.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- CMEP provides USACE experience globally
- CMEP brings wide-ranging US support:
 - o USACE Emergency Management experience
 - o 34,000 engineers and scientists
 - o Broad-based GIS experience

Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration

The presenter began by providing a brief overview of the IBRD program's goals, objectives, participation, and deliverables. The IBRD program is a DOD-DHS co-funded and run program. The goal is to reduce the time and resources necessary to recover and restore wide urban areas, military installations, and critical infrastructure following a biological incident. The key focus areas of the program are DOD's ability to reconstitute mission critical functions; compliance with federal regulations/standards; and community resilience and defense support of civil authorities.

The presenter then discussed the first IBRD, which used the national planning scenario #2 and tailored it to the Pacific Northwest region. It examined decontamination, characterization, and clearance activities. The interagency participation was fairly robust and included EPA, CDC, NOISH, FEMA, DTRA, FBI, DOT, DNI, DOC, several military installations, NORTHCOM, USAF, USA, NGB, Washington State, and the private sector. The first key finding of the demonstration was that current national capabilities and methods for recovery set an initial timeline for wide-area restoration of 10 years. Since standard property leases allow for tenants to walk away after 6 months of unavailable access, the U.S. needs game changer technologies to bring the timeline below 6 months. The second key finding was remediation activities need to be flexible to allow for multiple approaches. The last key finding was risk-based approaches for characterization, decontamination, and clearance are required to compress time lines.

The focus of the presentation was on the IBRD Marshall Center (MC) Community of Interest Event (COI) that took place in Germany this March. The event was designed to understand the gaps in the capabilities required to assist in the recovery from a biological incident in Europe in order to identify future DTRA program requirements and objectives. It also sought to enable participants to expand their network of partners in the biological response and restoration community of interest including EUCOM and its component commands, OSD Policy/ASD-HD ASA, ASD GSA, ASD-SOLIC, and DOS. The event used a scenario driven tabletop exercise, which posited an anthrax attack in Bulgaria, to facilitate discussion on these key issues. The breakout groups identified program requirements to support biological incident response and recovery in four key areas, which included public health; community resilience; prioritization; and, command, communications and international cooperation.

The presenter concluded his presentation by discussing the next steps. The most important upcoming event is the Capstone Exhibition, which is the culmination event of all the IBRD program activities. It will be held on 21-23 September 2010 in Seattle, Washington.

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- The goal of the IBRD is to reduce the time and resources necessary to recover and restore wide urban areas, military installations, and critical infrastructure following a biological incident.
- The key finding of the first IBRD was current national capabilities and methods for recovery set an initial timeline for wide-area restoration of 10 years. Since

standard property leases allow for tenants to walk away after 6 months of unavailable access, the U.S. needs game changer technologies to bring the timeline below 6 months.

- During the IBRD MC COI, program requirements to support biological incident response and recovery were identified by participants in four key areas, which included public health; community resilience; prioritization; and, command, communications and international cooperation.
- The most important upcoming event is the Capstone Exhibition, which is the culmination event of all the IBRD program activities. It will be held on 21-23 September 2010 in Seattle, Washington.

Panel Discussion: CM/HA/DR – Differences in Response

The panel began with presentations from each of the panelist that provided their perspective on the CM and Humanitarian Assistance (HA)/Disaster Relief (DR) issue. There was disagreement among several of the panelists on the issue. One of the most important and salient points brought out by the panelists was that the distinction between HA and DR is often left out of the discussion, which is important because they are two distinctly different mission sets. DR is defined as “urgent, life-saving services provided in immediate aftermath of natural or man-made disasters.” HA, on the other hand, is defined as “activities which serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the affected country.”

On the FCM and HA/DR blurring line issue, the panelists were divided. On one side of the issue, panelists felt FCM and HA/DR should remain separate mission sets because of five key aspects that are inherent in the FCM mission that do not necessarily overlap with the HA/DR mission. First, unless we are responding to a TIC/TIM event caused by natural disaster, we must assume this was a CBRN attack and further attacks are possible. Second, an FCM event places our forces in an uncertain threat environment, which will drive requirements for intelligence and force protection, as well as there may be concurrent CT operations ongoing. Third, the HN and US ability to provide a rapid and capable response may dissuade future adversarial CBRN attacks, is an essential part of the FCM mission. Fourth, there will be a likely panic factor in the general public as people either move away from the attack zone or try to avoid additional potential target areas. Fifth, attribution of attack will be a HN and US national priority. Forensics operations will be conducted concurrently with FCM operations. Finally, NGOs and other civilian organizations will be less prevalent in the early stages of an FCM operation, especially in the areas contaminated by CBRN.

On the other side of the issue, the panelist argued that the mission, tasks, and capabilities for FCM and HA/DR are so similar that the mission sets could potentially be combined or are already combined in action at the COCOM level. For example, DOD mission for DR is the U.S. military is not an instrument of first resort in responding to humanitarian crises but supports civilian relief agencies. Also, the U.S. military may be involved when the military provides a unique service; civilian response capacity is overwhelmed; and civilian authorities request assistance. Moreover, when the U.S. military does become involved the military mission should be clearly defined; the risks should be minimal; and other core DOD missions should not be affected. Both components of this mission significantly overlap with the FCM mission.

The first questions the panel the examined was whether or not an all-hazards approach would be more beneficial for command and control and planning for a CBRN response. Some of the panelists believed an all-hazards approach was more beneficial because it would be more in line with our allies approach to the issue. Most allies struggle with the idea that we have separate CM and CBRN response cells because they see the incident through one lens. Other argued that COCOMs are already struggling to get forces on

PTDO for the FCM mission. If the DOD was to move to an all-hazards approach, some panelists believe this task will be nearly impossible. The next topic of discussion was the commonalities among COCOMs related to the peculiarities of the FCM mission. It was concluded that the use of situation teams during a CBRN incident was the only commonality among the COCOMs because each AOR has its own resources and challenges. For example, if CENTCOM wants to use the forces in its AOR for an FCM mission, it would have to re-mission the forces. NORTHCOM, on the other hand, has the CCMRF at its disposal. One of the panelist pointed out during the discussion that we seem to be missing a key piece of the discussion, which is how do our allies and other countries want FCM assistance delivered. As such, the question that should be examined is whether or not our organizational construct is an obstacle for the receiving nation. Along this line of thinking, one of the conference participants asked which countries actually separated CM and HA/DR. While it was unanimous that none of the countries in any AOR separated CM and HA/DR, one panelist did caveat their answer by asserting that it may be a function of a lack of national plans for CBRN response. One of the solutions posed for this debate was for the community to examine the tasks of the DR and FCM mission sets and determine if the CBRN task are significant enough to warrant separate missions. The panel concluded with questions that the panelist felt should be examined in follow-on discussions, which included What is FCM? Is FCM possible in every AOR? Are life-saving tasks part of the FCM mission? What is the availability of CONUS assets for the FCM mission?

Key Issues/Takeaways:

- DR and HA are two distinctly different mission sets. DR is defined as “urgent, life-saving services provided in immediate aftermath of natural or man-made disasters.” HA, on the other hand, is defined as “activities which serve the basic economic and social needs of the people of the affected country.”
- The main question examined during the panel was whether or not an all-hazards approach would be more beneficial for command and control and planning for a CBRN response. Some of the panelists believed an all-hazards approach was more beneficial because it would be more in line with our allies approach to the issue. Other argued that COCOMs are already struggling to get forces on PTDO for the FCM mission. If the DOD was to move to an all-hazards approach, some panelists believe this task will be nearly impossible.
- The following questions should be examined in follow-on discussion: What is FCM? Is FCM possible in every AOR? Are life-saving tasks part of the FCM mission? What is the availability of CONUS assets for the FCM mission?